The Evaluation of Community Economic Development Initiatives by H.W. Armstrong et al.
Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, 457–481, 2002
The Evaluation of Community Economic
Development Initiatives
H. W. Armstrong, B. Kehrer, P. Wells and A. M. Wood
[Paper  rst received, November 2000; in  nal form, July 2001]
Summary. Community economic development (CED) initiatives expanded rapidly in urban and
regional policy in the 1990s. Traditional evaluation methodology has, however, proved to be
extremely dif cult to apply effectively to CED. This paper examines existing monitoring and
evaluation procedures for CED, the problems faced in applying traditional methodology and
possible ways forward to ensure that more effective monitoring and evaluation can be under-
taken. Evidence is drawn from four detailed case studies of urban CED projects funded as part
of the 1994–96 Yorkshire and the Humber Objective 2 Structural Funds programme. These case
studies were deliberately designed to experiment with alternative quantitative and qualitative
evaluation methods.
1. Introduction
This paper examines the suitability of the
traditional evaluation methodology for com-
munity economic development (CED) initia-
tives. As a vehicle for examining the issues,
evidence is drawn from detailed case studies
of four CED projects—an environmental
project, a childcare scheme, a development
trust and a credit union. These projects were
undertaken as part the 1994–96 Yorkshire
and Humber Objective 2 Structural Funds
programme, spending on which continued
until the end of 1998. The case studies were
deliberately included within the formal ex
post evaluation as a means of experimenting
with new approaches to CED evaluation
(Government Of ce for Yorkshire and the
Humber, 1999a). All four projects were ur-
ban projects, as was typical of most CED
projects in the programme. This re ects the
urban concentration of socially excluded
communities in the UK (Green, 1997).
The paper begins (section 2) with a brief
description of the 1994–96 Yorkshire and
Humber Objective 2 programme and the pos-
ition of CED within it. This is followed in
section 3 by a review of current evaluation
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methodology. Section 4 presents the results
of the four case studies. The paper concludes
with suggestions for the future monitoring
and evaluation of CED.
2. CED in the 1994–96 Yorkshire and
Humber Objective 2 Programme
The European Union (EU) has been involved
in regional policy initiatives in the Yorkshire
and Humber region of the UK since the
origins of the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund (ERDF) in 1975. Large-scale EU
activity in the region, as elsewhere in the
UK, really only began in earnest with the
major reforms of the ERDF and other Struc-
tural Funds phased in between 1989 and
1993. The 1989–93 programme, as with ear-
lier EU interventions in regional policy in the
region, tended to focus on traditional types of
regional policy initiative (for example, sup-
port for infrastructure projects, business sup-
port measures for small and medium-sized
 rms, measures to assist in introducing new
technology).
CED initiatives are a radical new type of
policy initiative. They have their origins in
urban policy in the UK in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. They represent an attempt to
draw local communities much more closely
into policies designed to regenerate econ-
omic activity in their neighbourhoods . CED
was, however, introduced to the Structural
Funds only in late 1994. Since then, it has
rapidly expanded, mirroring a similar trend
in UK domestic government policies (for
example, New Deal for the Communities,
and recent rounds of the Single Regeneration
Budget—SRB).
The initial impetus for CED in the Struc-
tural Funds came from debates on social and
economic exclusion in the Delors White Pa-
per (Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1993). These were reinforced by the
Essen and Madrid Presidencies which made
job creation the paramount priority of the
Structural Funds. The importance of employ-
ment initiatives was enhanced by a report on
employment in ‘third-sector’ activities
(European Commission, 1995) and by the
1997 Amsterdam Treaty.
The UK regions have had to cope with a
steep learning curve for CED. Guidelines
were, however, eventually provided by the
European Commission (1996). These
identi ed two elements of CED. First, it
should be a process, “the end point of which
is sustainable development and reconversion
in spatially targeted areas” (European Com-
mission, 1996, p. 19). Above all, this process
is based on capacity building which aims to
release “forces for reconversion and develop-
ment at the local level and facilitate the
wider mobilisation of social capital” (p. 19).
The second part of CED is community link-
ing: the process by which communities be-
come reinserted back into the mainstream
economy. In common with CED in the UK,
the Commission’s model envisages an area-
based approach in which policy initiatives
release latent community energies through a
combination of partnerships and the local
‘ownership’ of the strategy.
A serious problem with all CED is that
any given designated area may contain sev-
eral social, ethnic or demographic communi-
ties. Thus, one challenge for CED is to
mobilise different interest-groups to tackle
the problems within their area, whilst recog-
nising that different communities will rarely
be wholly enclosed by geographical
boundaries. Identity is not necessarily a pre-
cursor for de ning a community in this con-
text. Rather, ‘identity’ is something which
could be developed by the process of CED
itself.
It should be noted that the Structural
Funds have deliberately been focused on a
narrower range of types of help for socially
excluded communities than other schemes
such as SRB. The Structural Funds are con-
centrated on initiatives having the potential
to generate economic bene ts in the form of
jobs, new enterprises, etc. The Commission’s
goals are therefore more explicitly economic
in nature (Lloyd and Ramsden, 1998).
The Yorkshire and Humber region is a
large one (with a population of 5.4 million
persons) in the north-east of England. It con-
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tains a diverse mixture of urban, rural, indus-
trial and tourist sub-regions. The Objective 2
area of the region during the 1994–99 pro-
gramme period comprised virtually the whole
of South Yorkshire (including the city of
Shef eld), together with large parts of West
Yorkshire (although excluding its largest city,
Leeds) and Humberside. The 1994–96 York-
shire and Humber programme had 6 Priorities
and 23 Measures (Government Of ce for
Yorkshire and the Humber, 1995). CED was
a free-standing Priority (Priority 6) which was
allocated 17.4 per cent of the budget. Table 1
gives the amount of money made available
for CED, together with the sums eventually
committed to projects. In addition to £41
million of European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund
(ESF) money, an extra £65 million of match-
ing funding was eventually found (almost all
from the public sector, principally local au-
thorities). Other British Objective 2 regions
have also witnessed large and expanding
CED Priorities (Government Of ce for York-
shire and the Humber, 1999b, Table 6.2).
As Table 1 shows, CED spending was
spread between four separate Measures. Mea-
sure 6.20 (Training and employment) was an
ESF-funded Measure focusing on training
and skills acquisition. Measure 6.21 (Support
for community based economic projects) was
the largest of the 4 Measures (both in terms
of spending and the number of individual
projects—111). Measure 6.21 also contained
most of the types of CED of interest here, in
the sense of posing new challenges for evalu-
ation. Despite its name, in practice only a
small part of Measure 6.21 help went directly
to genuinely community businesses (Arm-
strong et al., 1999). Measures 6.22 (Targeted
environmental improvements) and 6.23 (Ac-
cess to work through improved public trans-
port) were dominated by a few large
infrastructure projects.
The designated CED areas were nominated
by partners (particularly the local authorities)
on the basis of a variety of indicators of
exclusion and deprivation. The resulting areas
encompassed 35 per cent of the Objective 2
region’s population.
The 1994–96 programme sought to de-
velop a more comprehensive set of monitor-
ing indicators than in earlier programmes,
together with signi cant improvements in
evaluation methods. The Single Programming
Document also incorporated a more extensive
ex ante evaluation than had been the case
prior to 1994. Subsequently, in 1997, the
Programme Monitoring Committee (PMC)
commissioned an unusually large interim
evaluation (or ‘thematic review’—Armstrong
et al., 1998; Government Of ce for Yorkshire
and the Humber, 1997).
3. Current Evaluation Methodology
The European Commission has developed a
recommended system of evaluation for the
Structural Funds (MEANS, 1995a, 1995b).
This, like the UK government’s domestic
equivalent (HM Treasury, 1995), represents a
distillation of 30 years of regional and urban
policy evaluation research. The fundamental
principles of regional policy evaluation com-
mand a wide consensus and, as a result, the
Treasury and MEANS systems are extremely
similar. While monitoring and evaluation pro-
cedures have been signi cantly strengthened
in the 2000–06 programme period (European
Commission, 1997), they remain  rmly based
on traditional evaluation principles.
The MEANS approach recommends a
combination of ‘top–down’ and ‘bottom–up’
evaluation techniques (for cross-checking
purposes). ‘Top–down’ methods analyse sec-
ondary data sources, while ‘bottom–up’
methods collect and analyse primary data
through sample surveys of bene ciary busi-
nesses and individuals. ‘Top–down’ tech-
niques seek to estimate ‘global’ impacts (for
example, aggregate GDP increases, or em-
ployment), whereas the ‘bottom–up’ tech-
niques proceed by identifying microeconomic
impacts on individuals and  rms. The ‘micro’
impacts are then aggregated to give global
effects.
The origins of traditional evaluation
methodology lie in ‘top–down’ techniques.
Early regression-based methods (Moore and
Rhodes, 1973) were quickly extended from
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job creation to other important impacts and
from time-series to spatial cross-sectional
data-sets (see Armstrong and Taylor, 2000,
for a survey). Regression analysis, in more
sophisticated forms, continues to be used
(Williamson, 1998; Wren and Taylor, 1999).
However, ‘top–down’ evaluations now also
comprise sophisticated alternatives to re-
gression analysis. Macroeconomic models
estimate an array of impacts other than em-
ployment and also enable the system-wide
effects of a policy to be traced. Unfortu-
nately, they are also extremely demanding of
data. It is for this reason that most Objective
2 regions use less sophisticated regional
econometric models and input–output mod-
els. Even these are unavailable in the English
regions.
In the English regions, ‘top–down’ evalu-
ation is reduced to using very simple meth-
ods. Most regions have used baseline
analysis as the main type of ‘top–down’
evaluation. This approach involves collecting
detailed statistics on a range of economic and
social indicators for the start year of the
programme (hence ‘baseline’). Evaluation
then tracks changes from these baselines
over the programme period in order to check
whether improvements have occurred.
Baseline analysis is very useful in its own
right and led to signi cant improvements in
the analysis of economic trends within the
Objective 2 areas in the 1990s. Baseline indi-
cators can be disaggregated to the level of
the sub-regions and local areas within the
Objective 2 region. The region’s perform-
ance can also be pro tably compared with
other UK Objective 2 areas (Government
Of ce for Yorkshire and the Humber,
1999b). Seasoned students of evaluation will,
however, recognise how weak a technique
baseline analysis is. The economic perform-
ance of a region is affected by many things,
of which the Structural Funds represent only
one. Many other things can change, such as
international trading conditions or sudden
sectoral shifts (for example, the recent run-
down of the coal industry in South York-
shire). Baseline analysis is fundamentally
incapable of estimating the ‘counterfactual’:
what would have happened to the region in
the absence of the Structural Funds.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, to
 nd that ‘bottom–up’ methods have domi-
nated recent Structural Funds evaluations.
This is also true for evaluations of domestic
regional and urban policy initiatives (see, for
example, PA Cambridge Economic Consul-
tants, 1993). ‘Bottom–up’ surveys seek infor-
mation directly from the bene ciaries and
contain four types of question:
(1) Deadweight. Would the additional di-
rectly created jobs (or other forms of
economic activity) have occurred irre-
spective of the Structural Funds assist-
ance?
(2) Displacement. Are the jobs created at the
expense of jobs in competitor  rms else-
where in the Objective 2 area?
(3) Supply chain effects. Do the expanding
businesses buy signi cant amounts of
their inputs from other local  rms, cre-
ating knock-on bene ts elsewhere in the
Objective 2 area?
(4) Multiplier effects. To what extent do the
extra jobs (via the wages paid) trigger
multiplier bene ts elsewhere in the re-
gion?
While these four differing effects of the
Structural Funds help have been described in
terms of help for businesses (rather than
trainees) and in respect of employment, the
principles they embody are relevant to every
other type of impact, whether economic, so-
cial or environmental in nature. The net im-
pact is obtained by beginning with the gross
impact, subtracting the deadweight and dis-
placement effects, and adding back the sup-
ply chain and multiplier effects. Net impact
is the key measure of success in traditional
evaluation methodology since it incorporates
both the counterfactual and system-wide im-
pacts of a programme.
The MEANS methodology recommends
that each Objective 2 region should conduct
its own ‘bottom–up’ evaluation. This is be-
cause the crucial coef cients for deadweight,
displacement, supply chain effects and multi-
pliers can vary from one region to another.
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The Commission has, however, sought to
distil benchmark coef cients by trawling pre-
vious evaluations of the Structural Funds
(Ekos, 1998). These benchmark values, such
as the typical cost-per-job for a CED project,
are valuable in their own right as summary
measures of how effective the Structural
Funds have been. They are also invaluable in
ex ante evaluations where the necessary em-
pirical evidence of outcomes does not, of
course, exist. Benchmarking is not, however,
a substitute in interim and ex post evaluations
for the direct collection of data from
bene ciary  rms and individuals.
Perhaps the most important role of all for
‘benchmark’ estimates is that they permit
comparisons of the relative effectiveness of
CED to be made with other types of initiative
(for example, inward investment, traditional
business support schemes). Indeed, where
they are in a suitable form (such as cost per
net new job), they can also be compared with
non-EU policies such as SRB or Regional
Selective Assistance. This is important since
it ensures that a further fundamental prin-
ciple of evaluation can be attained: the esti-
mation of the opportunity cost of a policy.
The Structural Funds are  nite—spending on
one project is at the cost of spending else-
where.
Application of traditional ‘bottom–up’
survey-based methods to the ERDF Mea-
sures in Priority 6 of the 1994–96 Yorkshire
and the Humber programme gave estimates
of only 1000–1600 gross new jobs and a
mere 500–1100 net new jobs (Government
Of ce for Yorkshire and the Humber,
1999a). Traditional methodology therefore
appears at  rst sight to produce meaningless
results for CED. Such a conclusion would,
however, be as unfair as taking the opposite
stance: that they ‘prove’ how inadequate
CED is. Neither is correct. The truth is much
simpler: the newness of CED in the 1994–96
Structural Funds programmes meant that too
little time had elapsed by the time of the
evaluations for employment bene ts to ac-
cumulate.
Another fallacious argument is that the
traditional evaluation methodology cannot be
applied to CED because the methodology
relies on quanti able indicators such as em-
ployment. This criticism rests on a misunder-
standing of the nature of traditional
evaluation methodology. Evaluation has
never had a problem with qualitative indica-
tors. Better examples of the genre have al-
ways incorporated qualitative measures (see,
for example, King, 1990). The focus on
quanti able measures in the past has arisen
simply because the goals of regional policy
have been almost wholly economic in nature
and therefore amenable to quanti cation. The
issue of the choice of appropriate indicators
for CED (whether quantitative or qualitative)
is, however, an important one and is care-
fully considered in this paper. The four case
studies were deliberately used to experiment
with a variety of modern methods of qualita-
tive analysis.
Nor should we fall into the trap of thinking
that the fundamental principles of evaluation
are inappropriate for CED because they are
somehow solely ‘economic’ in nature. It is
certainly true that supply chains and multipli-
ers are concepts relevant only to economic
impacts. The same is not, however, true for
deadweight, displacement and opportunity
cost. These apply equally to social, environ-
mental and political impacts of CED. Take,
for example, capacity building. In evaluating
a CED project it is surely important to seek
answers to the following types of question.
Would local community groups and net-
works have evolved anyway, irrespective of
the CED project? Have the highly localised
community networks stimulated by CED led
to a diminution of family-centred links or
contacts across the wider city? Has the CED
project absorbed funds which might better
have been spent elsewhere (on more tra-
ditional types of initiative), or perhaps even
just handed over as a cash transfer to local
residents? These are, respectively, dead-
weight, displacement and opportunity cost
questions.
If arguments that traditional evaluation is
solely quantitative and economic are incor-
rect, it is pertinent to ask in what ways CED
poses new challenges for evaluation. A priori
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reasoning suggests that four characteristics of
CED appear to pose unusually severe chal-
lenges:
(1) CED has multiple objectives. These in-
clude social as well as the more tra-
ditional economic objectives.
(2) Multiple target-groups of bene ciaries
exist. This is because CED areas typi-
cally contain different socially excluded
groups (for example, single parents, eth-
nic minorities, the long-term unem-
ployed).
(3) The bene ts of CED have unusually long
lead times, particularly during the ca-
pacity building phase. The pressing need
to develop suitable indicators of capacity
building has attracted considerable re-
search attention and is an issue examined
in detail in the next section of this paper.
Even more serious a problem for evalu-
ation, however, where assessing the ulti-
mate outputs and outcomes of CED must
be the prime goal, are the exceptionally
long lead times experienced by many
types of CED.
(4) CED areas typically suffer from ‘mul-
tiple deprivation’ (i.e. complex different
barriers to social and economic in-
clusion). Hence, they attract the attention
of many different public policies: there is
complex interlocking of initiatives. This
makes it hard to disentangle the impacts
of the different policy interventions—a
problem also known as the ‘multiple
counting of bene ts’.
It is interesting to note that the presence of
multiple objectives (challenge (1) above)
along with multiple bene ciary groups (chal-
lenge (2) above) means that single measures
of impact (such as jobs) or deprivation
indices (combining several measures) are
unlikely to be satisfactory. The former
cannot capture the multifaceted nature of
CED objectives. The latter would require a
system for weighting different indicators,
something not possible without an accepted
social welfare function, itself impracticable
since different groups in the local communi-
ties would attach different values to different
outcomes.
In the next section, each of the four chal-
lenges identi ed above is systematically ex-
amined.
4. The Four Case Studies
In order to obtain maximum bene t from the
case studies, attention was deliberately fo-
cused on those types of CED most likely to
pose the greatest challenges for traditional
evaluation methods. As noted earlier, the key
challenges arise in projects with multiple
objectives, extensive capacity building, long
lead times before signi cant bene ts are ob-
served, multiple funding streams and those
closely intertwined with other regeneration
policies such as the SRB. Case study projects
were therefore selected on the basis of these
characteristics. In addition, the selected case-
study projects had to meet the following
requirements:
(1) The project managers and local partner-
ship had to be willing to participate.
(2) Each project had to be reasonably rep-
resentative of CED projects in the pro-
gramme; they should not be prominent
‘ agship’ projects.
(3) The selected projects should cover, as far
as was possible, a wide range of different
types of CED (such as micro- nance,
intermediate labour market schemes).
Three of the four case studies subsequently
chosen were funded under Measure 6.21 and
the fourth under Measure 6.22. Direct em-
ployment creation projects, such as subsidies
for  rms, were deliberately excluded on the
grounds that their immediate economic
bene ts are amenable to traditional evalu-
ation techniques.
Case Study 1: NWICA Environmental
Improvements, Shef eld
This project was located in the north-west
inner-city area (NWICA) of Shef eld and
was undertaken by Shef eld City Council.
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Shef eld is located in the South Yorkshire
sub-region of the Objective 2 area. NWICA
lies within a belt of socially deprived locali-
ties to the North West of the city centre. The
project involved a series of environmental
improvements on council-owned land around
and between housing.
Seven targets were set for monitoring pur-
poses. These proved to be typical of other
CED projects in that they comprised a mix-
ture of activity indicators (for example, 15
trainees; the establishment of a local com-
munity group), and outputs (for example, 15
jobs). As is common with CED, the majority
of the target indicators measure activities
(i.e. inputs and processes) rather than  nal
outputs such as jobs. Across the CED Prior-
ity as a whole, fewer than one in four targets
were output indicators, the remainder being
activity measures (Government Of ce for
Yorkshire and the Humber, 1999a, Table
6.4). It is interesting to note that the list of
targets contained qualitative indicators (such
as ‘improving’ the community) as well as
quantitative measures.
The case study comprised an analysis of
the project’s monitored targets, semi-
structured interviews with those involved in
the delivery of the project, a review of sup-
porting documentation (including local UR-
BAN and SRB programmes), two focus
groups involving local residents (designed to
examine the process of community involve-
ment in the area, as well as obtaining views
on possible new monitoring methods) and a
series of pilot surveys of local residents,
businesses and property agents (estate
agents, housing action trusts and the council
lettings department). Formal questionnaires
and semi-structured interviews were conduc-
ted with target bene ciary groups (residents
and local businesses), using ‘community in-
terviewing’ with local residents being trained
to carry out the surveys. This method is
beginning to be widely used in this type of
research. It tends to give more accurate re-
sponses from local residents than is obtained
by using ‘outsider’ professional interviewers.
Taking in turn each of the four challenges
identi ed earlier:
(1) Multiple objectives. The project at  rst
sight has a refreshingly simple environmental
objective: to improve the green environment
of areas close to social housing (i.e. built
environment) being simultaneously reno-
vated. The green environment objective was
re ected in some of the targets (for example,
hectares of land ‘improved’). However, since
the project also had the aim of “adding to the
groundswell of activity in the area” (Business
Plan), there were clearly other wider objec-
tives too. These were not only economic (as
shown by a job creation target), but social
too (as shown by a crime reduction target).
Multiple social, environmental and economic
objectives therefore did exist. A problem
with this project, and virtually all other CED
projects, is that these wider objectives were
not explicitly stated. This is a serious prob-
lem for evaluation since if the  nal objec-
tives are not clearly stated, progress towards
them cannot be properly assessed.
(2) Multiple bene ciaries. The case study
was able to identify no fewer than six target
bene ciary groups: local residents, existing
local businesses, visitors to the area, property
agents (both public and private), community
groups, and new  rms entering the area.
Most of these were surveyed, new  rms and
visitors being the only exceptions. The long
list of target bene ciary groups is typical of
CED. Moreover, NWICA is known to be
typical of many inner-city localities in that it
contains a mixture of socially excluded
groups (JISER, 1997). Hence there are also
separate sub-groups within the ‘local resi-
dents’ category.
It is not clear which bene ciary group
forms the principal target of the project. In
common with many CED projects, it is as-
sumed that the bene ts will accrue to all of
the groups simultaneously. In practice, the
fact that the money is targeted at green areas
close to the residential blocks, and the in-
volvement of people in the local community
group established by the capacity-building
stage, strongly implies that local residents are
the principal initial target. Other groups,
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however, are clearly intended to be longer-
term bene ciaries.
(3) Capacity building and lead times. Ca-
pacity building is part of the process of cre-
ating ‘social capital’. To economists, capital
is an input, irrespective of whether one is
considering physical capital, human capital
or social capital. By contrast, many propo-
nents of CED appear to consider social capi-
tal to be an output—a bene t in its own right
for local residents. This difference of opinion
is likely to become an important one in the
future. In the event of CED initiatives failing
to create many traditional economic bene ts
via community linkage (such as permanent
jobs), it is likely that proponents will argue
that the creation of social capital will have
been worthwhile in its own right.
Given its importance in CED, it is clear
that new methods of measuring ‘community
capacity’ are needed. Fortunately, this issue
is now the subject of a lot of research. This
has led locally to indicators of capacity
building which quantify network ability (the
degree to which local community groups
come together to develop and deliver regen-
eration programmes), the extent of volunteer-
ing by local community members, the degree
of democratic participation and representa-
tion within local organisations and the degree
of involvement of local people in prior moni-
toring, representation and feedback (JISER,
1997).
Our own case study identi ed three further
dimensions of capacity building:
(1) the consultation process;
(2) community-strengthening effects;
(3) the role of community groups.
Taking each of these in turn, the effects of
the project on the consultation process were
sought using a combination of qualitative
methods (i.e. surveys, interviews and a focus
group) designed to obtain the opinions of
local residents. These suggested that in
analysing capacity building it is important to
distinguish between awareness-raising, con-
sultation prior to the project, and consultation
during and after the project. Awareness-
raising in NWICA had generally been more
successful than subsequent consultation
phases.
Turning to community-strengthening ef-
fects, previous research had successfully
measured participation rates in  ve types of
network: family/community, employment,
private service, public service and voluntary
service (JISER, 1997). This work suggested
that local networks of friends were as import-
ant as family links in NWICA. Moreover,
unemployment tends to lead to exclusion
from many networks.
In our own case-study work, again using a
range of different qualitative methods, four
further sets of questions were asked to ascer-
tain community-strengthening impacts.
(1) Has the project had signi cant effects on
the interaction between individuals? Re-
sponses suggested that activities other
than the project had a more signi cant
impact.
(2) Have the environmental improvements
had an effect on how safe the residents
feel? This question re ected one of the
key target indicators of the project. The
majority of responses were positive.
(3) Has the project changed interaction with
other residents? The majority of resi-
dents did not feel that the project had
stimulated links between residents which
were subsequently maintained after the
initial consultation process.
(4) Finally, residents were asked whether,
even if their own involvement in the
community had not increased, the in-
volvement of others in the community
had been. Respondents were aware of
increased activity of residents associa-
tions and community groups. However,
they felt that the actual project itself had
only a minimal effect.
Finally, there is the issue of the role of
community groups. NWICW has an Open
Spaces Group of residents and a Ponderosa
Environment Group (Ponderosa is an area of
open space within NWICA). Both groups
contain representation from an array of com-
munity groups, interest-groups, local agen-
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cies and the council. However, it was evident
that the structure of groups and their relation-
ships (for example, with Shef eld City
Council) had changed rapidly over the pre-
vious  ve years. These changes had been the
result of many factors; some were due to the
proactive role of key community activists,
some were due to the council and others
were due to requirements of European and
SRB funding.
The focus groups and supporting inter-
views highlighted the dif culties in unravel-
ling the impact of an individual project on
community-level partnerships. Given that the
case-study project did not have a speci c
remit to alter community-level partnerships,
it is dif cult to assess its impact in this area.
Responses from the Open Spaces focus
group suggested that the project’s effect on
partnership activity was either neutral or
negative. Focus group work also showed that
the local community group established
speci cally for the NWICA project (and one
of the formal targets of the project) had
subsequently been disbanded, with members
being subsumed into new groups subse-
quently formed.
The case study showed that capacity build-
ing in a CED project is amenable to system-
atic monitoring and evaluation. ‘Community
capacity’ is, however, a complex concept,
with a number of different dimensions to it.
Moreover, only some of these dimensions are
amenable to quanti cation. Our case study
did, however, show that modern qualitative
approaches can be combined with quantitat-
ive indicators to allow evaluation to proceed.
The result, however, is more complex and
costly monitoring and evaluation, particu-
larly as a combination of different qualitative
methods give the best results.
There remains the issue of lead times for
capacity building. This issue is crucial if
CED is ever to be properly evaluated. In each
of the case studies, a determined effort was
made to try to establish orders of magnitude
of lead times. For environmental projects
such as NWICA, the case study found that
the lead times depend crucially upon which
market the project is seeking to produce
community linkage into. The NWICA proj-
ect offers possibilities for linkage to three
different markets.
1. The property market. By improving the
green environment of the area, increased de-
mand for council, housing action trust (HAT)
and private residential property, together
with commercial property (retail, industrial
and leisure sector), should occur as the image
of the area improves. Surveys were conduc-
ted with local property agents (estate agents,
HATs and the council lettings department)
and residents. The aim of these was to ident-
ify the relative importance of environmental
improvements to the regeneration of the area
(for instance, in comparison with issues such
as crime) and the lead times for the environ-
mental improvements to affect the property
market. Most residents felt that the improve-
ments had contributed to the area feeling
safer and encouraged residents to stay in the
area. These are, of course, immediate
bene ts with short lead times.
Gauging how long a lead time there will
be before the project has an impact on prop-
erty prices in the private-sector property mar-
ket is more dif cult, and is hindered by the
small size of the local private property sector
(70 per cent of residential property is social
housing). As an experiment, interviews were
conducted with local estate agents and other
property market businesses in Shef eld.
Only a small proportion of the total turnover
of estate agents in Shef eld is in NWICA.
For instance, one estate agent estimated that
only 0.3 per cent of the  rm’s annual
turnover was in NWICA. However, drawing
on experience in both NWICA and other
similar areas in Shef eld, the estate agents
suggested that lead times of around 20 years
would be the appropriate time-scale for en-
vironmental impacts to be re ected in the
local property market. This then is the kind
of order of magnitude of lead time one can
expect for targeted environmental improve-
ments in CED areas.
2. The labour market. The project was
designed to have both direct bene ts (i.e.
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training, work experience and temporary
employment) and indirect effects (i.e. in-
creasing the attractiveness of the area for
 rms). The key impact of the NWICA
project on the labour market is through its
15 trainees. A pilot survey was conducted
of the trainees who were employed by
Shef eld Works Department for the duration
of the scheme. This sought information
on the intermediate labour market (ILM)
within which the trainees found themselves.
Information was sought on the trainees’
experience of the project (type of of training,
work experience, etc.), what each trainee was
doing immediately prior to the scheme, the
level of satisfaction with the scheme,
quali cations gained, trainee activities since
leaving the project and various personal
details (such as gender, ethnic group).
Additional questions were included to ascer-
tain the number and spells of vocational
training, employment and unemployment the
trainee had faced, since the project  nished,
in the past  ve years and over their working
life.
The questions asked are typical of ESF
and other training policy evaluations. They
re ect the need to track the effects of ILM
schemes over time via longitudinal analysis.
Former trainees can be dif cult to track. This
problem can be addressed by requiring proj-
ect sponsors to maintain details on former
trainees, something which is vital if ILM
components of CED are ever to be properly
evaluated. Our own survey suggested that the
lead times for ILM are likely to be much
shorter than for property market impacts—
three years or less for the NWICA project.
3. Final product markets. The project may
also improve the competitiveness of  rms in
the area, hence impacting on  nal products
markets. In order to explore this issue, busi-
ness surveys were piloted on two groups of
bene ciaries: manufacturing businesses
within the small (and diminishing) NWICA
industrial area; and businesses in the retail
area. There was a clear divide in responses.
Manufacturing  rms had few views on the
environmental improvements and most were
not even aware that they had taken place.
This group, however, held very strong views
(some positive, some negative) on the effects
of other local EU-supported projects (es-
pecially Shef eld’s Supertram and other lo-
cal built environment improvements). Retail
businesses had a far greater awareness of the
changes which had occurred. From the sur-
veys, it was apparent that the environmental
improvements undertaken will have only
long-term effects on the competitiveness of
local businesses (again up to 20 years). Most
 rms also thought that the bene ts of en-
vironmental improvements would only ac-
crue if integrated with the wider economic
and social regeneration of the area.
(4) Interlocking initiatives. NWICA is eli-
gible not only for ERDF help, but also UR-
BAN and SRB funding. Moreover, parts of
the area have  rms eligible for EU and na-
tional industrial policy incentives. A wide
array of projects has been implemented in the
area, drawing on many different funding
streams. Across Priority 6 as a whole, it was
found that CED projects in the 1994–96 pro-
gramme had accessed no fewer than 11 ma-
jor types of external funding (for example,
Lottery, charities, etc.) from over 50 different
sponsor organisations (Government Of ce
for Yorkshire and the Humber, 1999a).
These greatly exceed  gures for numbers of
funding streams and sponsors engaged in
other more traditional types of regional pol-
icy such as business support measures. Initia-
tives in NWICA at the time of the case-study
project included the remodelling of the hous-
ing stock, together with projects designed to
increase social solidarity, build community
capacity and develop employment opportuni-
ties. The case-study project itself was part of
a wider environmental initiative (SRB and
local authority funded), focused on the man-
ufacturing and recreational parts of NWICA.
Hence, although the project itself involved
only three funding streams (ERDF, local
authority and SRB), it was part of a closely
interlocked group of other initiatives.
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Case Study 2: Holmewood Kidzone (Work
and Training through Childcare), Bradford
This was one of a series of initiatives deliv-
ered by a local partnership, the Holmewood
Consortium. Holmewood is a large periph-
eral housing estate in south Bradford. Brad-
ford is part of the West Yorkshire
conurbation (which also includes the main
city of Leeds). It combines inner city socially
excluded communities with peripheral disad-
vantaged housing estates. The project pro-
vided an array of types of out-of-school
support for children and parents, including
collecting children from school, providing
care and activities during holidays and sign-
posting residents to other community-based
initiatives leading to training and employ-
ment opportunities. The project’s targets
were a typical CED mix of activity measures
(such as before- and after-school places for
children) and output indicators (for example,
permanent jobs for parents). More, however,
were quantitative targets than is usual for
CED.
The case study comprised an analysis of
monitored targets of the project, semi-
structured interviews with the project man-
ager and others closely involved (such as the
local college and TEC), a review of support-
ing documentation (for example, the proj-
ect’s business plan), a review of the  ndings
of an in-house ‘capacity-building’ research
project and a Bradford-wide capacity-build-
ing evaluation, a focus group convened with
the members of the Kidzone management
committee, and series of pilot surveys of
local residents and businesses on the Holme-
wood estate (the target bene ciaries). The
surveys were again conducted by trained
community residents.
(1) Multiple objectives. The project deliber-
ately focused on an economic bene t—help-
ing parents (especially lone parents) to  nd
employment. Where possible, staff to run
Kidzone were recruited locally. The ERDF
support was utilised by Kidzone to extend
existing services (themselves funded from a
variety of sources).
Although its primary objective was the
straightforward economic one of assisting
lone parents in  nding training and employ-
ment, Kidzone also aimed to provide activi-
ties for children which would ‘keep them off
the streets’ and reduce the risks of them
becoming involved in crime. Provision of
high-quality care was also seen as providing
parents with peace of mind which would not
exist otherwise. There were, therefore, sec-
ondary objectives of a social nature. Multiple
objectives clearly therefore did exist.
(2) Multiple bene ciary groups. Given the
stated objectives of the project, it is clear that
unemployed lone parents were the principal
target-group. However, the project in prac-
tice had an array of other potential
bene ciaries. The case study was able to
identify these as local residents, community
groups, existing local businesses and new
 rms entering the area. Most of these groups
were subject to pilot surveys as part of the
case study.
(3) Capacity building and lead times. Con-
siderable efforts have been made to build
community capacity on Holmewood and the
ERDF project was part of a wider capacity-
building initiative encompassing all of Brad-
ford’s CED areas. As part of this initiative, a
full-time ‘community capacity builder’ had
already been employed on Holmewood.
The experience of the capacity builder in
running the project highlighted a key differ-
ence between the focus of the Holmewood
project and NWICA, the previous case study.
NWICA’s capacity building focused on indi-
vidual participation and the strengthening of
community partnerships. Holmewood’s ca-
pacity builder focused on how capacity
building can help individuals to overcome
barriers to their re-entry into the labour mar-
ket. These barriers may be individual (for
example, a lack of self-con dence) or organ-
isational (for example, poor links between
the different parts of the Holmewood Con-
sortium). Unlike NWICA, core community
organisational capacity in the form of the
Holmewood Consortium was already in
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place. For the Kidzone project, therefore,
capacity building was mainly concerned with
enabling residents to  nd employment or
take up training opportunities (i.e. personal
capacity building). The Kidzone project is
therefore much closer to the  nal com-
munity-linking phase of CED than the
NWICA project.
The more advanced nature of capacity
building in the Kidzone project meant that
the Holmewood Consortium had already
built up an unusually deep understanding of
how best to measure capacity building. In
addition to the aspects of capacity building
stressed in the NWICA study (i.e. consul-
tation process, community-strengthening and
the role of community groups), two further
characteristics are seen as crucial to success
(1) Awareness and use of community re-
sources (including Kidzone, the consor-
tium’s Edwards Rainbow Centre, job
search and the family services unit).
(2) Interest in courses and training. The
Holmewood research discovered that
more than half of respondents were inter-
ested in taking courses for the following
reasons: personal interest, improved job
prospects, to gain additional
quali cations, social reasons and
con dence building These appear to be
important measures of how personal ca-
pacity has grown.
As with the other case studies, project man-
agers, the focus group and the surveyed resi-
dents were asked to identify the likely lead
times required for initiatives to have an im-
pact. Typical responses were that two years
was a suf cient length of time for most of the
intermediate impacts of the project (for ex-
ample, for provision of childcare places).
Successfully overcoming labour market ex-
clusion (i.e. permanent jobs) and crime
would take longer it was thought, but within
a 10-year horizon.
(4) Interlocking initiatives. The Kidzone
project turned out to be an excellent example
of just how complex the interrelationships
between a CED project and other initiatives
can be. The Holmewood Consortium is a
mature organisation. It has an array of initia-
tives funded from different sources. The
project managers of Kidzone were therefore
well placed to exploit strong links with other
activities designed to increase the quality of
life on the Holmewood estate.
In summary, the Kidzone project exhibited
multiple economic and social objectives and
also had multiple bene ciary groups. In prac-
tice, however, the key goal was an economic
one (successfully linking residents into the
formal labour market) and lone parents were
the principal target-group. In other respects,
Kidzone is more typical of wider CED
projects in that capacity building was import-
ant and the ERDF project was interwoven
with many other initiatives.
Case Study 3: Heeley Development Trust,
Shef eld
This project was built on an earlier round of
ERDF support provided to Heeley City
Farm, an initiative located within the inner-
city area of Shef eld. The project sought to
place the organisation on a  rmer footing by
establishing a Trust with an independent
 nancial and legal status, and by building up
its activities to take the capacity-building
process to its next logical stage. The project,
in stark contrast to the Bradford Kidzone,
was almost wholly concerned with capacity
building. It is therefore an excellent example
of CED activity in which capacity is being
built from a low base and in which there are
at present few community linkage effects
yielding economic bene ts.
Four targets were set for the project. One
was an output indicator (to create two jobs
with the Trust), another was an activity target
(to ‘assist’ six SMEs) and two were measures
of capacity building (to establish the Trust
and develop a long-term strategy). The
targets are very revealing since they are typi-
cal of the kinds of target currently being set
for capacity-building CED projects. They
show how dif cult it is to de ne quanti able
targets for capacity building.
With capacity-building projects, the ability
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to sustain the process is crucial and is often
hampered by the short time-horizons of most
of the funding bodies (including the Struc-
tural Funds). The Trust has therefore sought
to turn itself into a self-sustaining organis-
ation supported by involving itself in an
array of different public-sector and
private-sector activities. The Trust’s role is to
act as a catalyst to community-based organi-
sations that would in turn support residents
and local businesses.
Research for the case study comprised an
analysis of monitored targets, semi-
structured interviews with the project man-
ager and others closely involved in the proj-
ect, a review of the supporting
documentation (for example, business plans,
action plans and previous research) and pilot
surveys of the main target bene ciary
groups.
(1) Multiple objectives. The project had the
following stated objectives
(1) To work towards the reduction of local
unemployment, particularly youth unem-
ployment, through the development and
establishment of community enterprises
and the provision of training and work
experience.
(2) To work towards improving the environ-
ment of the local area, through the devel-
opment of further funding bids.
(3) To create an information and resource
agency for the area with the possibility
of this eventually forming a separate
community enterprise.
(4) To co-ordinate capacity building in the
area through consultation with various
groups to identify need and develop
common solutions to problems and to
disseminate ideas and expertise.
These show clearly that there are multiple
objectives present: economic, environmental
and social. Unlike the NWICA and Kidzone
projects, however, the focus of the project
itself is almost entirely on capacity building.
Very little attempt has been made to specify
the objectives (for example, reduced unem-
ployment) expected once the community-
linking phase is reached. It is only through
the  rst objective (help for new local enter-
prises) that immediate community linkage to
the economy is expected.
(2) Multiple bene ciary groups. Identifying
the target bene ciaries of capacity-building
organisations such as the Trust is a complex
task given its interest in almost all aspects of
a community’s activities. Interviews with the
Trust’s managers, however, showed that the
primary aim of the Trust was to stimulate the
activities of a lower tier of other community
organisations—it is these therefore which are
the direct bene ciaries. However, the Trust’s
ultimate aim is clearly to help residents and
businesses. Hence, three different sets of
target bene ciary groups can be identi ed,
between them encompassing virtually the
whole community. This is a wider array of
target-groups than in any of the other case-
study projects.
(3) Capacity building and lead times. As
noted earlier, the project was designed to
provide almost all of its support for the ca-
pacity-building phase of CED, primarily for
its establishment and identi cation of poss-
ible future initiatives for the Trust. It would
therefore be inappropriate to expect that the
Trust will have a substantial impact on com-
munity organisations, residents or businesses
over the time-period of the project (20
months).
The Trust is the product of earlier rounds
of capacity building. Through the interaction
of individuals, established community
groups, schools, local businesses and outside
agencies, the Trust is now in a position to
enable a process whereby local people are
involved in regeneration. However, inter-
views with the Trust managers showed that
the real aim of the Trust in the long term was
to achieve economic viability and sustain-
ability, both for residents and for the Trust
itself.
The case-study research discovered that
local awareness of the Trust was high, pri-
marily because of its newsletter, the New
Heeley Voice. The consultation process is
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therefore well under way. Prior research on
community capacity in the Heeley area has
shown that resident participation in the SRB
area of which Heeley is part was low (34.8
per cent of residents being involved in one or
more voluntary groups against  gures for
NWICA and the UK of 42.1 per cent and
54.3 per cent respectively). This suggests
that the Trust still has more community-
strengthening work to do.
It is, however, via community groups that
the Trust has had most success. The Trust
provides support for an array of community
organisations. Comparing the Trust’s activi-
ties with the wider research literature on
development trusts suggests that the Heeley
Trust has less direct control over activities
which help residents than trusts elsewhere.
This is an interesting  nding and is perhaps
re ected in the wide-ranging initiatives in
which the Trust’s bene ciary organisations
are involved, and the wide range of organisa-
tions af liated to the Trust.
A European Commission study identi es
three aspects of capacity building which are
useful for assessing the success of organisa-
tions (such as the Heeley Trust) which seek
to strengthen community groups (Ekos,
1998, Appendix C)
(1) Function. What is it that assisted com-
munity groups are enabled to do through
Structural Funds intervention?
(2) Sustainability . To what extent has assist-
ance improved the sustainability of
groups in terms of the tenure of their
existence and their need for on-going
public-sector support?
(3) Coverage. To what extent have groups
been assisted to increase their penetra-
tion of their target constituencies (i.e.
bene ciaries)?
The Ekos study suggests that a useful start-
ing-point for gauging the impacts on the
function of capacity building is the extent to
which support enables community-based
groups to extend their role and play a greater
part in regeneration and development. The
suggested starting-point is a roles model de-
veloped by the Community Development
Figure 1. Role progression in capacity building.
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Foundation which posits a continuum in
terms of the functions that groups can adopt
(see Figure 1). This model suggests that
evaluation should attempt to gauge the dis-
tance travelled by those groups supported.
This will not be appropriate to all organisa-
tions, but is relevant to most and can be
adapted to  t most circumstances. It is also
true that many organisations will not aim to
become a ‘deliverer of economic services’.
However, the rationale behind CED is that a
critical mass of organisations should be en-
gaged either as the deliverer of economic
services or as a long-term partner service by
the end of a project.
From interviews with the project man-
agers, a survey of assisted organisations and
analysis of the content of the Trust’s action
plan, it appears that the Trust has established
the capacity to act as a long-term partner
service. Moreover, the organisational, com-
munications and  nancial capacity to design,
negotiate and implement a CED action plan,
would suggest that the Trust has more than
ful lled the Commission’s criterion of hav-
ing built capacity (European Commission,
1996). Our survey of bene ciary organisa-
tions also suggests that these have progressed
to become the ‘source of project ideas and
focus of activity’ suggested by the roles
model (Figure 1). All of the organisations
surveyed in the case study stated that they
would not have undertaken these activities
without the support of the Trust.
Turning to the issue of sustainability , one
measure proposed by the Ekos (1998) study
is the period of tenure of the assisted groups.
The organisations surveyed in our case study
were already in existence prior to the estab-
lishment of Trust. However, the organisa-
tions did stress that the support provided by
the Trust had enabled them either to provide
training to residents or had provided them
with business advice. The organisations were
still in existence at the end of the pro-
gramme. The Ekos study suggests that a
good measure of sustainability is a simple
count of the groups established/assisted by a
project which remain in existence at the end
of the programme. However, this clearly has
limitations and does not provide an indi-
cation of long-term sustainability. A more
suitable measure would be to gauge whether
organisations supported are capable of con-
tinuing their operations without public sup-
port.
Finally, there is the issue of coverage: the
ability of the supported organisations to
target their key bene ciary groups. The case-
study research suggested here that there is
wide variation in the degree of coverage
from organisation to organisation. Develop-
ment trusts in other communities typically
have both social and economic functions, of
which some may have commercial viability.
This is certainly true of the Heeley Trust and
most of the other organisations it itself sup-
ports. The case-study research did show,
however, that once the target bene ciaries
have been identi ed (whether residents, busi-
nesses or both), evaluating coverage should
not be too dif cult a task. It should be poss-
ible for most CED projects to identify and
count the number of residents and businesses
of different types involved. More importantly
still, it should be possible to calculate the
proportion of residents who are involved in
community economic regeneration groups.
This should allow close monitoring of the
penetration of community activity.
(4) Interlocking initiatives. Development
trusts and the various other community or-
ganisations they support typically access a
wide array of different funding streams, and
Heeley is no exception to this. Moreover, the
CED area is eligible for a range of other
types of national, urban and regional policy
scheme. In the case of Heeley, it is SRB
which has provided the most visible help in
recent years, but there have been many other
types of intervention too. The case study
showed clearly that this type of CED project
has many more interlocked initiatives than
other types of CED.
Case Study 4: Dewsbury Credit Union
Credit unions and other micro credit initia-
tives operate in intermediate credit markets,
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from which mainstream banking services
have withdrawn or which they have always
ignored. Although intermediate credit mar-
kets do not necessarily have a geographical
dimension, the existence of concentrations of
 nancial exclusion (or ‘red-lining’) suggests
that they at least have some geographical
elements.
Why banks withdraw services from inter-
mediate credit markets may be largely ex-
plained by the existence of one or all of the
characteristics of risk aversion, information
asymmetry, transactions costs in serving
low-income communities and prejudice
(Dymski, 1995).
Credit unions attempt to overcome some
of the problems of transactions costs and
information asymmetries. For instance, credit
unions, by being locally based, know more
about the people they lend to and the like-
lihood that they will repay. They are also in
a better position to monitor repayments.
In the context of Structural Funds, credit
unions and other micro credit institutions
appear to be a hybrid of initiatives which
combat poverty and those which focus on
economic regeneration and jobs. At present,
support is overwhelmingly skewed towards
the former. Evaluation is therefore unlikely
to  nd evidence of much direct job creation.
The aim of the case-study project was to
create a single credit union for the whole of
Dewsbury in West Yorkshire. Dewsbury is a
town within the West Yorkshire conurbation
and lies immediately to the south of Leeds,
the principal city in the sub-region. It is one
of the smaller towns in the area, and com-
prises a diverse mixture of areas of social
exclusion and more prosperous suburbs. The
target population included both residents and
employees commuting into Dewsbury. The
project had a series of novel features in-
tended to build on previous experience with
credit unions to ensure long term success. In
particular, four distinct phases were envis-
aged
(1) Initial awareness-raising by actively pro-
moting the bene ts of a credit union in
the area.
(2) The establishment of a study group
drawn from a core group of individuals
who expressed an interest in being ac-
tively involved from the start.
(3) Capacity building using the study group
as the start-point (for example, training
the study group via an accredited Open
College Network course in skills rel-
evant to credit union development—
especially book keeping and credit union
management). The core members of the
study group were eventually to become
the management committee.
(4) Registering and establishing the credit
union itself. At the time of the case
study, the credit union was in the process
of being registered with the Registrar of
Friendly Societies.
The case-study project was sponsored by
Kirklees Metropolitan Council and was run
by full-time project managers who had ex-
tensive prior experience of credit unions.
ERDF support was provided for pilot work,
the training and establishment of the credit
union and the refurbishment of premises.
Matching funding was provided by SRB. To
ensure suf cient membership (to maximise
economies of scale and reduce risk), the
credit union was made available to the whole
of Dewsbury (i.e. both CED and non-CED
areas alike). This is an interesting feature
since most previous credit unions have been
con ned to residents within the socially ex-
cluded area. The project had  ve main target
indicators for monitoring purposes, only two
of which were output measures (jobs).
As in the previous projects, the case-study
research comprised an analysis of target indi-
cators, semi-structured interviews with the
project managers, a review of the supporting
documentation (the business plan, previous
national research on credit unions and the
literature on  nancial exclusion) and a focus
group involving members of the management
committee of the credit union. Focus groups
and surveys of local citizens were not con-
ducted in this case study since at the time of
the research the credit union had not been set
up, the project having only just reached the
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end of its capacity-building phase. However,
semi-structured interviews with local
 nancial institutions were used to examine
the role of banks in the regeneration of
Dewsbury and views of professional local
bankers were sought on  nancial exclusion
and credit unions.
(1) Multiple objectives. The project appears
at  rst sight to have a very straightforward
economic objective: to rectify capital market
failure. This is re ected in the stated long-
term aims of the project which include gener-
ating more widespread access to  nancial
services as an alternative to mainstream
high-interest, low-convenience  nancial in-
stitutions, and retaining more money within
the local economy (i.e. ‘internal blocking’ of
the local multiplier). The objectives were to
be achieved by extending core credit union
services (by providing a cheque service) to
include bill-paying services, payment of in-
surance premiums and credit links to other
community-based businesses.
While it is true that credit unions do have
more focused economic objectives than most
CED projects, it is important not to take too
simplistic a view of this in the evaluation
process. The manager interviews and the fo-
cus group both highlighted the fact that the
credit union is expected eventually to have a
wide array of direct and indirect effects on
residents, including community capacity
building. Multiple objectives are therefore
again present.
(2) Multiple bene ciaries. The challenge to
evaluation posed by the presence of multiple
bene ciaries is less serious with credit
unions than with other CED projects. The
target bene ciary group is residents and one
can also safely assume that this means all
residents in the area. However, the Dewsbury
case study does highlight an inherent
dif culty with CED micro-credit initiatives.
Previous experience with credit unions has
shown that if they are con ned solely to the
residents of a single social exclusion area
they are more likely to fail (or else stabilise
at a very low level of membership). The
Dewsbury project therefore wisely sought a
wider membership from the start. The impli-
cation of this for evaluation, however, is that
a careful check needs to be kept of how far
the scheme brings bene ts to the original
target area of social exclusion. The hijacking
of social policy initiatives by the af uent
middle class has been a perennial problem in
Britain, a problem CED too may experience.
Credit unions must also be aware that,
while the target bene ciaries comprise the
full population of the CED area, different
sub-groups within the area may require
speci c targeting within the scheme. For ex-
ample, the Koran contains strict usury laws
forbidding the receipt of interest on savings.
Issues such as this have implications for
evaluation, particularly the need to present
results disaggregated by ethnicity (and per-
haps also age and gender).
(3) Capacity building and lead times. At the
time of the research, it was impossible to
gauge whether the credit union had led to
any capacity-building effects over and above
those required to select the study group and
to raise awareness. This is because the actual
credit union had not yet been created. How-
ever, much of the literature on credit unions
highlights that most succeed only when key
capacities of both the core group and the
wider membership are built (see New Eco-
nomics Foundation, 1997, for a review).
Work by Birmingham Credit Union Devel-
opment Agency suggests the following as
minimum criteria for a mature credit union
(1) An active membership of over 250.
Dewsbury Credit Union aimed for 300
members in its  rst year and an eventual
target of 1000 members.
(2) Assets of over £400 000 with at least
£240 000 out as loans (a 60 per cent
ratio). The Dewsbury Credit Union
aimed for an asset base of £330 000 but
with a higher assets– loan ratio of 75 per
cent. This would produce a surplus
suf cient to allow the employment of a
full-time manager.
The case-study research suggested the fol-
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lowing additional criteria for capacity build-
ing via a credit union
(1) A core group of volunteers. Perhaps
numbering at least 20 persons, who will
eventually form the management board
and develop an appropriate array of
skills ( nancial, marketing, promotional,
organisational).
(2) A high-quality service. In the early
stages of credit union development, it is
essential that the core services (savings
and loans) be delivered without fault.
Without this, trust will be quickly lost.
(3) Membership. Credit unions need to en-
sure that membership is a balanced one,
primarily by geographical location, and
also to ensure that services are open to as
wide a population as possible. However,
the focus group and the wider literature
counsel that detailed information on
members should not be collected as this
may create barriers to key customer
groups.
(4) Links to other initiatives. If credit unions
are to contribute actively to the wider
community economic regeneration
agenda, they need to engage with their
local communities. This is likely to be
realised through a number of roles such
as awareness-raising and promotion
through other CED initiatives, interlock-
ing membership with other community
partnerships, using community facilities
as collection-points for interest and loan
repayments, and using community part-
nerships to provide a vehicle through
which the credit union services are made
more responsive to the members.
The evidence from the case study also sug-
gests that it is the consultation and com-
munity-strengthening aspects which are of
particular importance. Once established, a
credit union can play a role in strengthening
wider community groups, but this is less
important for such a focused initiative as a
credit union than it is for other types of CED.
(4) Interlocking initiatives. This is much less
severe a challenge with credit unions than
with other types of CED. The Dewsbury
Credit Union project did have SRB support in
addition to ERDF. The local authority was
also actively involved. However, evaluating
the success or otherwise of a single credit
union rarely involves disentangling the ef-
fects of more than two or three partners.
5. Conclusion: A Way Forward?
This paper has argued that the fundamental
principles of traditional evaluation methodol-
ogy are as relevant for CED as for other types
of regional and urban policy. Indeed, it is
particularly vital with such an untried type of
policy as CED to estimate the counterfactual
(particularly deadweight and displacement ef-
fects), and its effectiveness compared with the
traditional types of assistance with which
CED must compete for scarce resources (i.e.
its opportunity cost). Unfortunately, in the
1994–99 Structural Funds programmes, as
with the UK’s domestic CED policies, very
little progress has been made in extending
traditional evaluation principles to non-econ-
omic impacts of CED (i.e. social, political and
environmental). In addition, there has been a
tendency to treat CED evaluation differently
from other types of policy. A good example
of this is the way in which displacement
effects on jobs are calculated. Displacement
for CED projects is typically calculated at the
level of the individual tiny local CED area,
whereas for other policies (for example, sup-
port for SMEs), displacement is estimated at
the level of the whole Objective 2 region. The
bigger the geographical area, the bigger is
displacement. Current evaluation practice is
therefore preventing comparison of the effec-
tiveness of CED relative to other traditional
initiatives.
The case studies have clearly shown that all
four characteristics of CED which pose the
greatest challenges for evaluators seeking to
apply traditional evaluation methods (i.e.
multiple objectives, multiple bene ciary
groups, capacity building and interlocking
initiatives) are present in each of the projects
studied. The fact that all four characteristics
are present even in projects with super cially
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simple objectives (such as a credit union) is
a signi cant  nding. The four sets of charac-
teristics are by no means unique to CED and
have long been present in traditional regional
policy. What is new, however, is the degree
to which they are present in CED.
Is there a way forward for evaluation in
the 2000–06 Structural Funds programming
period? The simplest way forward would be
to soldier on with current methods. This is
super cially attractive. Many of the prob-
lems with evaluation in the 1994–99 pro-
gramming period will melt away as the
necessary hard empirical evidence on CED at
long last begins to accumulate.
There are, however, three reasons to reject
the ‘no change’ option. First, the evidence
available even by 2006 will still fall short of
many of the lead times for bene ts identi ed
in our case studies (for instance, NWICA has
lead times in excess of 20 years). Moreover,
such a long run of evidence will only be
available for those CED projects ‘rolled for-
ward’ into the 2000–06 programme. Sec-
ondly, if one accepts the (still untested)
opinion that capacity building confers utility
in its own right, then monitoring and evalu-
ation need to be extended to incorporate
greatly improved measures of capacity build-
ing. Thirdly, to concentrate, as at present, on
direct economic bene ts (such as jobs) is at
variance with the underlying philosophy of
CED. Proponents of CED have made radical
claims: that many different economic, social
and environmental objectives can be attained
simultaneously by a single initiative, and that
all target bene ciary groups can bene t sim-
ultaneously (i.e. pure pareto gains). Far bet-
ter, surely, to use evaluation rigorously to
test these assertions than to assume that they
are true.
Since the simple option is not available,
what light do the case studies throw on a way
forward? In our opinion, four steps are poss-
ible.
(1) More Comprehensive Monitoring and
Evaluation
CED evaluation in the future will inevitably
be more costly and time-consuming if it is to
be effective. This is fully recognised by the
European Commission. Advances in the
MEANS system, such as transversal evalu-
ation (European Commission, 1999a), more
advanced evaluation techniques (European
Commission, 1999b) and improved sets of
indicators (European Commission, 1999c),
are well suited for future evaluation. Our
case studies, however, show that CED
projects unusually long lists of both objec-
tives and target bene ciary groups. The ines-
capable logic of this is that extremely large
matrices of impacts will need to be estimated
for CED (comprising all combinations of
objectives and target-groups). Moreover,
there will be a different matrix of objectives
and target-groups for each project. Table 2,
for example, sets out a fuller list of the
indicators appropriate for each of the four
case-study projects. This kind of pragmatic
project-by-project set of indicators will be
vital in future CED evaluation exercises.
Our case studies therefore show just how
formidable a task ‘bigger and wider’ evalu-
ation for CED is going to be. Much more
effort will need to be put into the initial
clari cation of objectives and target
bene ciary groups. In addition, the over-
whelming evidence of previous (traditional)
evaluation research is that policies almost
never attain multiple objectives simul-
taneously or generate pure pareto gains.
Trade-offs are much more likely. The almost
complete lack of trade-off analysis for CED
means that much original research still needs
to be done. Who is  lling the jobs created in
the CED area (locals or in-commuters, the
unemployed or those previously in jobs)? Is
the social networking encouraged by CED
enhancing or disrupting existing (perhaps
family) networks? Are some groups
bene ting from the project at the cost of
others? These are the kinds of issue for
which hard evidence must be sought.
The need for ‘bigger and wider’ evaluation
is not the fault of traditional evaluation
methodology. It arises directly from the more
ambitious objectives and community-wide
‘reach’ of CED. The expansion of monitor-
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ing and evaluation will place heavy bureau-
cratic burdens on partner organisations and
project managers. Bureaucratic overload is
already a serious problem in the Structural
Funds programmes (Government Of ce for
Yorkshire and the Humber, 1997). One poss-
ible escape route from this dilemma could be
to focus on only one or two key objectives
and target-groups in the CED area. However,
even if the key objectives and targets could
be clari ed at the outset, this approach would
run counter to the all-embracing nature of
CED. It also runs counter to the Com-
mission’s attempts to widen evaluation in all
Priorities to incorporate horizontal aims such
as equal opportunities, environmental impact
and social inclusion. A second escape route
would be to focus only on the economic
impacts of CED, which are more tractable.
This too, however, clearly runs counter to the
philosophy of CED. There therefore seems to
be no escape from ‘bigger and wider’ evalu-
ation.
(2) Combining Quantitative and Qualitative
Methods
The case studies have revealed that CED
projects are best monitored and evaluated
using a combination of quantitative and qual-
itative methods. This is particularly true of
the capacity-building phase. Moreover, what
works best is a combination of different qual-
itative methods (focus groups, community
interviewing, etc.), a range of different
indicators (of consultation, community-
strengthening, etc.) and the disentangling of
personal and community capacity building.
The particular combination of quantitative
and qualitative methods will vary from proj-
ect to project. (Further details of the methods
found successful for the four case-study
projects discussed in this paper can be found
in Government Of ce for Yorkshire and the
Humber, 1999a, Annexes.)
(3) Lead Times for Capacity Building
This is a greatly neglected area. Future
evaluation will need to develop much better
initial clari cation of expected lead times, as
has been undertaken for each of the four case
studies reported here, and to ensure that these
are monitored and subsequently evaluated.
The case studies reveal that lead times differ
hugely between and within CED projects.
The real problem of long lead times in CED
is a pragmatic one: hard evidence of the  nal
community-linking phase has not had time to
accumulate. Evaluators in the 2000–06 pro-
gramming period will be fortunate in having
much more data available on this issue.
There is a real opportunity here to make
progress.
(4) Interlocking Initiatives and ‘Synergy’
The problem faced by CED with interlocking
initiatives is a triple-barrelled one: many dif-
ferent partner organisations, funding streams
and projects are jumbled together in the same
small area. This situation raises two funda-
mental questions: whether it is worth trying
to unpick this tangled web and, if so, how to
do it. Current evaluation practice does indeed
try to unpick the web since it is individual
CED projects which are evaluated. Our case
studies show that all four projects exhibit
complex interlocking effects. Our own pro-
posal for a way forward in this matter is a
two-fold one.
First, many CED projects (perhaps most)
are relatively free-standing in terms of their
impact on the local area. The Dewsbury
Credit Union and Holmewood Kidzone
projects are good examples. They can proba-
bly be safely evaluated as free-standing
projects. There is still the task of dividing up
bene ts between the EU and matching fund-
ing providers, but a simple rule of thumb
such as a division in proportion to  nancial
contribution would probably suf ce.
Secondly, projects such as NWICA and
the Heeley Development Trust, however, are
inextricably intertwined with other projects
and partners. The presence of genuine syn-
ergy in these cases makes the division of
bene ts a pointless exercise. What then can
be done? A two-stage procedure may offer a
way forward. First, with an area-based policy
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such as CED, the only effective way to dis-
cover if synergy is occurring for the cluster
of interrelated projects and partners is to
conduct ‘top-down’ analysis over a reason-
able time-period. This was conspicuously
lacking in the 1994–99 programmes, mainly
because CED areas are so small that key
secondary data series are lacking. It is vital
that suitable area-level data series be devel-
oped for the CED localities. The 2001 popu-
lation census will greatly assist this process,
but much more primary data collection is
inevitable if progress is to be made. The
extension of ‘top–down’ evaluation to CED
will still not enable the contribution of indi-
vidual projects to be evaluated, but will al-
low the extent of synergy—or lack of it!—to
be judged and also to restore cross-checking
to the evaluation. Secondly, ‘bigger and
wider’ evaluation offers the chance to obtain
more disaggregated evaluation results (by
objective and target-groups). A better picture
of the distribution of bene ts locally is valu-
able in its own right (for example, for expos-
ing trade-off situations). However, a further
bene t is that disaggregated results can shed
more light on precisely which project or
partner organisation has had the most effect.
A project such as NWICA, for example,
should impact much more on certain types of
properties and resident groups than others.
Disaggregated results will help to reveal
whether this has in fact been the case. There
will, of course, be limits to how far this
process can be taken. After all, if genuine
synergy does exist, it is illogical to try to
separate individual contributions: the whole
is greater than the sum of the individual
parts! In practice, however, we may well  nd
that once top-down analysis comes into play,
genuine cases of synergy are much thinner
on the ground than many proponents of CED
currently argue.
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